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David Schleifer

Reforming Food:  Trans Fats, Cleanup and Innovation

When and how do corporations change the products they manufacture?  This dissertation explains how oils containing trans fats entered the American food system and how companies are replacing those substances, which are now associated with heart disease.  Rather than assuming that industry resists change by dominating other institutions, or that industry consents to change only when social or political pressures become insurmountable, the case of trans fats illustrates the mutually constitutive relationships among corporate behavior, social movement activism, academic science and federal regulation.   Corporations do not act unilaterally.  Social movements, scientists, government and industry jointly develop goals and approaches to achieving those goals that can result in the comprehensive reform of risky technologies. 

The project contributes to the emerging macro-orientation in the social study of science, but extends the field by focusing on industrial technology.  Sociologists have used two related models to characterize how industry acts with science and technology.  The corporate hegemony model tends to show corporations manipulating science and technology in order to produce goods, such as food, with minimal regulation.  The risk society model tends to argue that inherently uncertain scientific knowledge renders industrial technology unavoidably hazardous.  But the corporate hegemony model erroneously implies that corporate interests are inflexible.  The risk society model erroneously implies that technologies themselves are inflexible.  I draw from actor-network theory to challenge both of those models.  Based on interviews, archival research and policy analysis, the empirical chapters discuss activist groups targeting industry; engagement between academic and industry scientists; the development of federal labeling regulation meant to promote technological change; and the ways in which industry developed trans fat alternatives. 

Scholars who see corporations as hegemonic might describe the food industry’s turnarounds – using saturated fats in the mid-twentieth century but replacing them with trans fats in the 1980s, only to replace trans fats with new oils in the 2000s – as an example of conspiratorial manipulation of scientific knowledge and technology.  But my research shows that in the 1980s, health-oriented activist groups vigorously campaigned against food manufacturers’ use of saturated fat and promoted trans fats as a healthy alternative.  Corporations were able to respond quickly because oils containing trans fats had gradually become available and viable over the course of the 20th century.  In the 1990s, however, a food industry coalition funded government scientists whose research confirmed studies by academic scientists showing trans fats were probably worse than saturated fat.  Activist groups eventually reversed their position and petitioned for federal trans fat labeling in 1994.   Many sociologists assume that labeling only individuates risk.  But the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) specifically designed trans fat labeling rules to create incentives for firms to change the content of foods.  In comments to the FDA, trade groups, corporations and other industry actors argued that manufacturers would be most likely to reformulate if they could tell consumers that their products had become trans fat free.  Many industry actors began developing trans fat alternatives long before the FDA finalized labeling rules.   Many major manufacturers replaced trans fats before labeling rules took effect in 2006, and many others did so soon thereafter. 

The widespread replacement of trans fats illuminates the conditions under which corporations’ interests shift toward cleaning up hazardous technologies.  Firms in a variety of industries may be less likely to resist evidence that their products are risky and may be less likely to resist regulation when they can find ways to reformulate products and to promote reformulated products as safer.  These developments cannot be attributed simply to scientific persuasion, activist agitation, corporate manipulation, or the endogenous impact of regulation.  Instead, institutions in interaction develop interests that lead to the emergence of new scientific consensuses and to the stabilization of new technologies.


Curriculum Vitae